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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with the allocat:i.onal effects and implications
for efficiency of a tax system in which the rate of tax on capital
income differs depending on the recipient of the income and on the
type of capital producing the income. It suggests that,in their
attempts to measure the distortionary effect of the U.S. capiial
income tax system, economists may have been looking in the wrong
places. In the presence of uncertainty, the intersectoral distortion
may be much less than had previously been imagined. However,the tax
system distorts at two other margins which have notreceived much
attention. It distorts the inter—household allocation of the
housing stock, since the after—tax rate of interest is one component
of the opportunity cost of owner—occupied housing. It also distorts
the inter—household allocation of risk—bearing. Calculations using
a simple commutable general equilibrium model suggest thatthe excess
burden from these latter twodistortionsare significant components
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This paper deals with the allocational effects and the implications for
efficiency of a tax system in which the rate of capital income tax differs
depending on the recipient of the income and on the type of
capital producing the income. It argues that in the presenceof uncertainty the
standard intersectoral misallocation problem may not be as large as
previously thought, but suggests that there are other sources of inefficiency
in thecurrent capital income taxsystem which must be consideredin
additiontothe intersectoral inefficiency In particular, there is an
inter—household misallocation of the housing stock, due to the differences
in the opportunity cost of housing, and there is an inter—
household misallocation of risk bearing.. Calculations using a simple
computable general equilibrium model indicate that the excess burdencaused
by these latter two distortions are signifl.cantcomponents ofthe total
static distortionary impact of the capital income tax system.
Two decades ago, Harberger showed that the magnitude of the allocational
shift caused by differential factor taxation and the size of the accompanying
excess burden depend on the degree of substitutability in the production
sectors, the degree of substitutability, among the final products,and
the relative factor intensities of production. Harberger's insights have
most often been applied to the allocational and efficiency implicationsof
the extra taxation that corporate capital income bears compared to non—
corporate capital income. Using a range of plausibleestimates for the
relevant parameters, Harberger (1966) concluded that the pattern of capital
income taxation prevailing in the U.S. during the mid—1950's reduced the
capital stock in the corporate sector by between one—sixth and one—third,
and imposed an efficiency cost of between $1 billion and $3 billion. Shoven
(1976) corrected Harberger's original estimates and, using the same2
parameters, found the deadweight loss tobe approximately 38 percent lower
than Harberger had calculated it to be The corrected efficiencycost
was between 0.2 and 0.6 percent of gross national product,though between
six and fifteen oercent of the revenue raised by the excesstaxation
that corporate capital income bears. More recent modelsin this tradition
(e.g., Fullerton etal (1981)) have improved the estimates byadding to
the detail of the stylized economy.
The mechanics and implications of the Harberger model have been
discussed at lengthelsewhere):' However for our purposes here it will
be useful to mention three characteristics of the model structure.
1. There is no uncertainty. This assumption implies thatIn
equilibrium the after—tax rate of return on capital mustbe equal for
allsectors.
2. Relative tax rates on different kinds of capital income are not
2/ household—specific.— Without this assumption, for any given vectorof
before—tax returns for some households the after—tax returns onsome assets
differ. Thus, households could arbitrage by going shortin the lower—
yielding asset and holding a long position in the higher—yieldingasset.u"
If there are constraints on borrpwing, the absenceof this
assumptioni1ieshousehold specialization in assets. With this
assimption the household portfolios are indeterminate,since assets are
perfect substitutes for each other, each earning the sameafter—tax
return with certainty.
3. Allhouseholdsface the same price vector for final goods.
one of these three characteristics accurately representsthe U.S.
economy. In this paper we show that thesethree unempirical assumptions
are critical to the model's predictions about theallocational and
efficiency effects of the U.S. system of taxing capital income. When3
the model is modified in such a way as to allow more realistic
assumptions, the model's implications may look quite different.
Theremainderof the paper contains three sections. Section II
presents a sipie general equilibrium model under certainty where
the opportunity cost of housing differs for different individuals,
The resulting exchange inefficiency is discussed and compared to the
inter—sectoral inefficiency caused by the tax system. In Section III
a general equilibrium model under uncertainty is presented. When
considered in this environment the intersectoral inefficiency may be
much lower than had been thought, though the exchange inefficiency remains,
This section then considers a third source of tax—induced inefficiency
in a stochastic economy, distorted allocation of risk—bearing. The
total welfare cost of taxation is then reconsidered using a modified
version of the general equilibrium model of Section II. Section IV
offer$ some concluding remarks.
II. A0 A Certainty Model
We will first focus our attention on the third assumption of the Harberger—
type models, that all individuals face the same price vector for final goods.
Even in the absence of explicit household—specific taxes, this condition will
be violated whenever some of the goods are durable. One component of the
opportunity cost of a durable good is the after—tax rate of interest When
tax rates differ, then households will necessarily face different net
prices for the durable good.
Housing is by far the most significant durable good in the U.S. In
Earberger's original classification of the economy into corporate and non—4
corporate sectors, housing comprised 67,5 percentof the non—corporatesector'
Since the service return from owner—occupied housing is not subject to taxa-
tion, the opportunity cost of owner—occupied housing is lowerfor house-
holds in higher taxbrackets.In order to assess the implications ofdifferential
rjces arising from differences in marginal tax rates,we present a model where
the only two vehicles for holding wealthareowner—occupied housing and non—
housing capital, the income from which is assumed tobe taxable.
Consider an economy where there are only two commodities, housing
services (H) and a composite non—housing good (C). Itis assumed that
the only way an individual can consume housing servicesis by owning housing
capitai-'; one unit of housing capital produces one unit of housing services
per period, with no labor input required.Then we can write the individual's
problem as
(1) Max U(C1,H1)
C. ,H.1 1 subjectto Ciwl+r(l_tj)(KiHi)_ôI1j+Tj
or c + [r(l —t.)+ o]H =wL,+ r(l —t,)K,+ T.
1 1 j 1 ii )_
Here.w represents the wage rate, r isthe rate of return tdholding
non—housing capital,t.the flat—rate tax on capital income, 1( is
the capitalandownent,(which maybedivided between housing and non—housing
capital), 5 isthe rateof depreciation on housing capital, and T. is
the transfer received from the government.Since the imputed income from
housing capital is not taxed, the tax structureis equivalent to one with an
income taxatrate t applied to all capital income, includinghousing
services, and a subsidy of tr to the consumptionof housing services.
Notice that two types of distortions result from this tax system. The
first is that the relative price of housing services and other goodsfaced5
by consumers in equilibrium will not equal the marginalrate of transformation
between the two goods, resulting in an inefficient provisionof housing services.
The second distortion stems from thefact that the relative price of
housing differs for different individuals.This implies that, for a
given stock of housing, the allocationof housing among individuals
is inefficient. In other words, reallocationof the housing stock,
accompanied by some set of transfer payments,could improve the welfare
of everyone.
By extending the Ilotelling/Harberger measureof excess burden,
we can analyze the contribution of the exchangeinefficiency to the welfare
cost. The standard expression, applicable whenthere is one representative
household and when producer prices are fixed, is
(2) L =—A S. .T.T. 2 ij 1313
wherei and jindexgoods, S1. is the compensated substitution term,
and T. and T. are the rates of tax. When there are manyhouseholds with
3
different rates of tax, the appropriate expressionis
(3) L =—A E , 2hi jijij
whereh indexes households. If the substitution termsdo not differ
by household, then this expression simplifiesto
(4) L =— (S.1 + cov(T.T))
where N is the total number of householdsand T. refers to the
1
averagehousehold value of •Inthe special case where there is6
a distorting tax levied on only one commodity, (for example, housing (H))
expression (4) becomes
(5) L =— NS( + var(TH))
GDmputing the welfare loss usingtheaverage tax rate thus underestimates
the actual welfare loss by the square of the coefficient of variation.
There are good reasons to believe, though, that the household tax
rates will not be independent of the substitution term. Since the marginal
tax rate is positively correlated with income, even if all households
had identical price elasticities of demand, the substitution termswould
be negatively associated with tax rates. Even with identical incomes
and utility functions the slope of the compensated demand function may be
different at different after—tax prices.
In this case, expression (4) may be rewritten, ignoring a higher—order term, as
(6) L =— N + ..cov(T.T.) + . cov(S. .,T.) + . cov(S .,T)) 2 1jij 1 jij 1, j 113 jj iJ




+ var(TH)) + 2H cov(SHH, TH))
Clearly to the extent that the tax rate is positively correlated with the absolute
value of. the.ubstitution term there is an amount of welfare loss not captured
by the earlier expresson. On the other hand if ISHHI and T11 are
negatively correlated the earlier measure of welfare loss is an
overestimate.7
These expressions overestimate the welfare loss when there is
an upward—sloping supply curve of housing services. It can be shown
thatin this case when only housing services are taxed the welfare loss
is equal to
h h2




-a--—isthe slope of the supply curve of housing services. When




+ var (T11)] ,
whichis equivalent to expression (5) with the addition of a factor
2 dS
multiplying TH •Whenthesupply curve is horizontal, then
is infinite, and (9) reduces to (5). When the supply curveisperfectly
S
inelastic4—= 0),theexcess burden is proportional to the variance
of the TH •Thuseven in the case where the total stock of housing is
Inelastic, thereis exchange inefficiency due to household—specific
prices for housing services.
II.B A General Equilibri Illustration
The inefficiency caused by the existence of differential prices of
housing services maybeof the same order of magnitude as the inefficiency
caused by the edstence of the subsidy to housing services. To illustrate
this, we consider a simple computable general equilibrium model of a
two—person, two—good economy of the type described above. Housing services
are produced using only capital with a constant—returns—to—scale technology,8
and the non—housing good is produced with a Cobb—Douglastechnology
(the share of capital income in the net product is0.2), The two
individuals have identical endowments of capital and labor,but
may face different tax rates on non—housingcapital income. All the
government revenue is returned to individuals throughlump—sum transfers
which are proportional to their (fixed) labor endowment.(A complete
description of the system is provided Ia Appendix A.)
The equilibrium of this economy can be computed exactly,and depends
on the behavioral and technological parameters,the tax rates, and the
government transfer policy. Given the equilibriumallocations, we can
calculate the utility level for each individual. Comparativestatic analysis
of alternative tax structures is accomplished by altering the tax parameters
Several measures of the resulting change in welfare are possible.
Our procedure is to calculate the change in national incomevalued
at prices before and after the policy change, and find the geometric
mean of these figures?'
We consider three alternative tax structures. The first features
no taxation of the capital income of either individual, sothat t1t20.
The second structure (the "one distortion" case) taxes non—housing capital
income, but at equal rates for both individuals, so that t1t20.3.
Finally, the third scheme (the "two distortion" case)features a progressive
tax system with rates that average to 0.3, but where ratesdiffer so
that t,0.l and t20.5.'
Thetheoryof the second best tells us that, generally speaking, we
cannot conclude that an economy with distortions at two marginsis more9
inefficient than if only one distortion existed. However, in this
example which uses standard assumptions about the structure of preferences
and technology the two—distortioncase does have a greater excess burden
than the one—distortion case, even though the total revenue raised is
about seven percen: lower in the two—distortion case. The details of the
equilibrium solutions are presented in Table 1 of Appendix A. Compared
to the no tax equilibrium, the onedistortion. tax structure causes an
efficiency loss of 0.92 percent of NNP, and decreases the non—housing
capital stock by 9.6 percent. These results are broadly consistent with
those reported by Harberger andShoven.' The two—distortion equilibrium,
where one household faces a much higher tax rate than the other, has an
excess burden of slightly more than 1.2 percent of NNP. The reduction
of the non—housing capital stock compared to the no—tax equilibrium is
10.6 percent.
The additional efficiency loss in the two distortion case, as
compared to the one distortion case, has two components. The
first is that, due to the structure of preferences, increasing
from 0.3 to 0.5 provides more of an incentive for household
2 to purchase housing than the decrease in t1 from 0.3 to0.1 provides
a disincentive to household 1. Thus,the total equilibrium housing stock
is greater than in the one distortion case and the inter—
sectoral misallocation is increased. The other componentof the increased
excess burden is the exchange inefficiencyresulting from the differential
user costs of housing. Starting from any givenlevel of the total stock
of housing, differential opportunity costs imply an inefficientallocation10
of the housing stock among households. To illustrate this point consider the
following experiment. Take an economy where the allocation of inputs to
sectors has been decided, and assume that the input allocation corresponds
to the equilibrium outcome in the two distortion case. Now suppose that
wecanreallocate housin services so that: both house.-
hold's marginal rate of substitution of housing services for the non—
housing goods are equal; that is, so the condition for exchange efficiency
is met. This reallocation will entail shifting housing services awayfrom
the highly taxed household toward the low tax household. Once this re-
allocation is accomplished, adjust the level of government transfers so
that household 1 is just as well off as it was before the reallocation.
The change in the utility of household 2 is then a measure of the welfare
gain from eliminating the exchange inefficiency.
The result of performing this experiment in our simple economy
is that the excess burden falls from 1.23 percent to only 1.02 percent of
GNP. Loosely speaking, the exchange inefficiency is the source of abbut
one—sixthofthetotalexcess burden.
IIl.A. Introducing Uncertainty
Uptothis pointtheanalysis has dealt only with a nonstochastic
environment. Inthissection that assumption is dispensed with by allowing
the capital incozae of the corporate sector to be uncertain, due perhaps
to thepresenceof a stochastic element in the production function.
Thiswill allow usto consider the implications of dispensing with the
first ocharacteristicsof the Harberger—type models that were
discussed above.11
We assume that in the presence of uucertainty households act
to maximize expected utility, which we assume for the sake of simplicity
i-fli canbe written as
N) (10) EU. = ,)—i
IiiI
iJ
where and I. now represent the iLh househoidts expected value
of consumption of the corporate good and housing services, respectively,
is a risk aversion parameter, and V. represents the variance of
the after—tax income stream.
In addition to equity shares in corporate capital which are risky,
there also are riskiess securities. Anynetsupply of these securities
is provided by the federal government; inaddition there may be riskiess
loans among individuals.
Uncertainty in an individual's income streamhas two sources.
The first source is non—zero holdings of corporate equity.The second
source of uncertainty is the transfer paymentreceived from the govern-
ment. When part of the tax base is corporateearnings, tax revenue itself
is stochastic. iniess the government cansomehow "absorb" this uncertainty
(perhaps by having a random debt policyand thus spreading the risk
across generations), the transfer paymentmust then also be stochastic.
The individual'ssoledecision is how to allocate his wealth
among thethreealternative assets: owneroccupied housing(H),
risky corporate capital ), andrisklesssecurities (B).
The choice of H determines the quantityof owner—occupied housing
services that will be consumed. Afterthe wealth allocation decision
is made, the state of the world isrevealed, including the return to12
corporate capital and the transfer received from the government. All
income is then spent on the corporate good, C.
Under these circumstances we can write the TDaxiJzaton
problem as
—iV.
(ha) Max U(C.,H) ——- ()
H.,B.,E 1 iii





Here rB and rE refer to the rate of return on the riskiess and risky securities,
respectively. V is the variance of the stochastic transfer received from the
government, VET. is the covariance between the flow of equity income and the
transfer payments and is the variance of the return from one unit of corporate
capital. The first two constraints can be combined into a single one as follows:
(lib) C + [rB(ltB.) + tS]H1 =wL+ rB(l_tB)Kl + [rE(l_tE) —rB(ltB.)IE.÷T.
En expression (lib), only C, iz and T. are stochastic. Thus (llb) implies
that
(hic) + [rB(i_tB)+ó]H1 =wL.+ r(ltK. + [E(1_tEi) —rJl_tE.].
The first—order conditions for this problem reduce to:
(12) =
rB(1tB.) +13
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The first condition is the standard requirement that the marginal rate of
substitution of housing for the corporate good be equal to the relative
price, which in this case is the opportunity costof owner—occupied housing plus
depreciation, rB(1_tB) + 5. The second conditionis an asset demand relation-
ship for equity holdings. The demand for equity depends positively on
the expected after—tax premium it earns over the riskiess asset, in-
versely on its after—tax variability and the degree of risk aversion,
and is inversely related to the covariance between its return and the
government transfer.
In the case where all households face the same tax rates (tE), the ex-
pected value and variance of government revenue can be written as follows:
(14) R =
tErEB+ tErEE
- 2.22 (lo) VT =
Ifit is assumed that the government must balance its budget and cannot
absorb any risk, then the total amount of transfers must equal R and
the transfers must exactly reflect the uncertainty of the revenues.
As an initial simplification, we assume that there are N identical
individuals in the economy. Furthermore, the government treats each14






In a large economy each individual can ignore the effect ofhis owndemand












From(20) we canformanexpression for E1. Then we sum the dmand
functionsand impose the equilibrium condition that
(21) EE. =E — .1 1







We can use this equation to determine the impact of changing the
taxationof corporate capital on the demand for corporate capital. or
small changes, it is not unreasonable to hold Urn constant; that is,
the marginal rate of substitution between corporate goods and risk per
unit of capital is assumed unchanged. Ih this case, the partial derivative
of expression (22) with respect to tE becomes:
2 afJ < 3) KJ 11c'B— tB)
2 2
E cYE(l —tE)
From(23), the response of demand for corporate capital to changes in its taxation
is seen to depend on the after—tax riskiess rate of return. This corresponds to
the result found by Gordon (1981)The intuition behind it is fairly
straightforward.Theexpected return to corporate capital has two cOm-
ponents, one of which is arisk premium, 'measured by the excess
ofthe return over the after—tax earnings of theriskiess asset. The other component
is the aftertax riskiess return. The tax on corporateincome falls on both components
of the return. However, that part of the taxthat falls on the risk premium reduce:
the uncertainty of the return as well as the expectedvalue of the return.
Infact, when rB is zero the reduction in the expected returnis exactly
the payment that individuals would be willing to pay to berid of the
uncertaintythe tax eliminates. Thus the tax on the risk premium cornpcnent
of the return does not alter the attractiveness of the corporate equity.
It is only the tax on the other component which alters itsattractiveness.
Thus, the bite of the tax depends Or(1tB), the after—tax riskiess
rate of return. If rB is zero, then there is no incentiveto alter16
equity holdings. If rB is non—zero, the incentive depends onthe sign
of rB, if rB is positive, increasing 1E will decrease desired equity
holdings, and if rB is negative, increasing tE will increasedesired
equity holdings.
This modaleasilygeneralizes to situations where individuals are
not identical, do not face identical taxrates,and the government does
not simply transfer 1/N of its revenuetoeach individual, Consider
thealternative rule that individual I receives s of government
revenue, where Es. =1.Then the following relationships hold:
(24) R =rEt .B. + r Et .E. B1Bii EEii
22 A22
(25) VT =(EtEIEI)°E(tEI.) E




Thetermt denotesthe weightedaverage tax rate on equity earnings
where the weights are the proportion of total equity held bythe investor;
thus the sum of the weights is unity. As above, we canfind the optimal












Of more interest than any individual's response to changes in tE
is the economy's response. To determine this we must aggregate over all
individuals. After some manipulation, wecanfind the aggregate analogue






Here k. denotes the share of total wealth owned by individual I
(k.K./K). Note that when is equal for all i, and tEi and
tBi are identical for everyone (so thatt =t1),then expression (30) is
equivalent to expression (22). However, in the general case the response of E
tochanges In tE does not reduce to a simple expression like (23).
The important message here is that the magnitude of the inter—sector
distortionary effect of the tax system may be much less than has pre—
vicusly been thought. Much of what has been considered to be distortion—
arytaxation ismore properly thought of as payment (at the market
price) for the government's participation in risk sharing. Does this
meanthatour system of taxing capital income is less distortionary than
we had thought? The answerisuncertain, for three reasons. The.
first is that the extent to which corporate capital income taxation is
merely payment for risk sharinghas not been precisely measured, and
would appearto be sensitive to a number of features of the tax systemJ18
The second reason is that even when the presence of uncertainty is
recognized the user cost of housing differs dramatically among individuals,
and is therefore a source of exchange inefficiency. Our simple example
in the riskiess case suggested that this distortion may amount to a non—trivial
fraction of the inter—sector distortion; its significance is not diminished
when uncertainty is introduced. Finally, under uncertainty the tax system
causes an additional distortion due to the inefficient allocation of risk—
bearing among the economy's individuals. This source of excess burden must
be considered in a complete assessment of the tax system. This is our next topic.
III. B. The Welfare Cost of Inefficient Risk Bearing
To see that the tax system may also cause an inefficient bearing of
the economy's risk, consider the market for the claim to a flow of income
which has an expected value of zero, which has unit variance, and which
is perfectly correlated with the stochastic income from the corporate
sector. At the consumer optimum, the marginal rate of substitution of











In order to eliminate the negative sign, we can consider the marginal rate
of substitution of the elimination of one unit of the risky claim for an
expected unit of good C. That is just the negative of expression (32), or19
r (1 —t.)— r(1 -t.)
(33) E B Bi
1 —tE.)
Notice that this expression does not depend on how much risk the
government returns to the individual. The independence propertyobtains
because individuals can undo (or augment) any uncertainty from the trans-
fer by selling or buying risky (and perfectly correlated)corporate shares.
Thatthe MRS neednot be the sameCor all individualsis clear from
expression(33).However,the presence of a progressive tax system does
notby itself assure the existence of differences. As long as the safe
asset and the risky asset attract the same tax rate, then the MRS reduces
to (rE —rB)/aEfor all individuals F(owever, in the U.S. corporate
capitalincome is first subject to a flat—rate corporate income tax, and
then the after—corporate—tax income is subject to the individual income
tax, at the standard rate for that part of earnings which is paid out as
dividends and at the capital gains rate for that part of earnings which
is retained within the corporation. Income from government debt is taxed
at the individual income tax rate. If the personal tax rate is denoted
then tE =T+ (1 —T)(dtB+ (1 —d)ytB)where r is the corporate
incoetax rate, d is the dividend payout rate, and y is the ratio
of the effective accrual—equivalent capital gains tax rate to the ordinary
income tax rate. If this expression for tE is substituted into expression
(33),it is clear that theMRS will vary among individuals depending on
By calculating the derivative of expression (33)with respect to tB
we can ascertain the direction of influence. After some manipulation,
wecanfind20




Since all tes other than rE are strictly positive, the direction of
influence depends on the sign of rE. As long as r is positive, the
marginalrate of substitution of a unit of risk reduction for an expected
unit ofgood C increases with the tax rate. In other words,the in-
efficiency in risk bearing takes the form of the higher—taxedindividuals
having too much risk and the lower—taxed individuals having toolittle
risk, There exists a reallocation of risk and expected consumption
(withthe higher—taxed individuals bearing less risk) such that all in-
dividuals are better off.
Thus itis thecombination of a progressiveindividual income tax
system and the current system of corporate capitalincome taxation that
causes the inefficiency. Complete integration of theindividual and
corporate income tax systems, so that tE equals tBfor all individuals,
would eliminate the distortion. More generally, though, any feature of
the tax system which differentially taxed the return of the risky asset
andsafe asset wouldbe subject to this kind of inefficiency.
Even in thepresenceof a completely integrated tax system, there is
reason to believe that there will still be inefficiencyin risk—bearing.
Thisis because inefficiency may result whenever the average tax rate on
risky capital is different than the rate which is applied todeviations
from the expected return, that is when the total tax rate, t,is equal
to tr + tR(rE —) wherer
isthe expected return and tR is
thetaxrate applicable to deviationsfrom rE. Therearemanyfeatures21
of the current system of taxing corporate capital income which cause tR
to diverge from tE. First of all, there are a number of tax incentives,
such asth investment tax credit, which serve to reduce,tE but which do
notreducethe marginaltaxon earnings. Working in the other direction is
corporations' observed tendency to keep dividends relatively constant while
absorbingincomeswings in variations in retained earnings. Since the
effective tax on retained earnings, th capital gains tax rate, is lower
that the tax rate on dividends, this kzLnci of financial policy causes tR
to be lower than tE•
Although there are forces operating in both directions, there is no
reason to expect that tE and tR will be equa:L. The import of this inequality is
that it is tR and not tE which belongs in the denominator of expression
(33). In this case even though tBand tE are equal, unless the ratio
of (1—tE) to (l—tR) is the same for everyone, there will be inefficiency
in risk—bearing. when tE and tB are not identical, then the additional
divergence of tR and tE may either increase or decrease the inefficiency of
bearing risk.
III.C.A Further General Equilibrium Illustration
The foregoing analysis has indicated that, compared to the certainty
case presented first, the excess burden of the capital income tac system is
lowerdue to the fact that the tax on the risk premium is non—distortionary,
but is higher due to the tax—induced inefficiency inprivaterisk—bearing.
In order to assess the net effect on the magnitude of efficiency loss, it
would be useful to construct a general formula for the approximate excess
burden,as we did in the certainty case. However, even in this relatively
simple model, a simple expression is impossible to obtain, due to the com-
plicated general equilibrium effects of changes in tEiand
tBi.A22
reconsideration of the stylized two—good, two—person economy will,though,
be helpful in assessing the effects of introducing uncertainty into the
model. A few additional parameters are required (e.g., measures of house—
hcid risk aversioi. the riskiness of corporate equity, separate tax rates
forriskiessdebt and corporate equity) to complete the model-. A complete
description of the model ispresentedin Appendix B.
As with the certainty model, we will investigate several different
tax structures and compare the equilibria and the excess burden. We
include the three tax structures studied under the certainty case, where
equity and riskiess security income are not distinguished;both tax rates
are zero in the first case, both are 0.3 in the second case,and :tCO.l
and t2= 0.5 in the third case. In the additional case we consider, corporate
equity and riskiess security income are taxed differently. Inorder to
approximate the total effective tax on equity income that resultsin a
classical corporate income tax system, we set tE T+(1 t)dtB where T
is the average corporate income tax rate and d is the dividend payment
ratio. This formulation assumes a zero effective capital gains tax rate.
Settingtto 0.4and dto be 0.5, we obtain a value of 0.43 for tEl and
0.55for tE2giventBl
and tB2 are 0.1 and 0.5, respectively.
The resultsofthese experiments, detailed in Table 2 of Appendix B,
arerevealing.Starting from the no—tax equilibrium, imposing aflat rate
taxof 0.3 on bothindividuals for both debt and equity income causes an
excess burden equal to 0.44 percent of and reduces the corporate
capital stock by 6.9percent(compared to 0.92 percent of NI1P and a
reductionof 9.6 percentin the riskiess case). Since the riskiess
interest rate is positive, not all of' the tax represents amarket23
payment for risk sharing, but the distortionary impactof the tax
is substantially less than in the riskiess case. Next we impose a
progressive tax system, but do not discriminate between assets, sothat
t 0.1 and tE2 =tB2
0.5 This tax system marginally increases
aggregate demand for housing and also causes aninefficient allocation of
the housing stock. The new equilibrium has au excess burdenof 0.65percent:
of NNP, and a corporate capital stock of 7.6 percent lower thanthe no tax
equilibrium. The additional inefficiency and allocationalshift
is of approximately the same magnitude as it was in the riskiess case.
However, it amounts to a larger fraction of thedistortion caused in the
absence of progressivity (forty—five percent compared to twenty—fivepercent).
This is due to the fact that the inter—sector distortion
is much lower when the risk—sharing nature of corporate taxation is
considered. Finally, we consider the unintegrated tax structure where
tE1O•43 tBl 0.1, tE2= 0.55, and tB2= 0.5.This tax structure has
two important effects: first, it raises the average rate of taxation
on corporate capital income, and, second, it introduces inefficiency in
the private bearing of risk. VInthe new equilibrium, thsre is an excess
burden equal to 1.67 percent of NNP, while thenon—housing capital stock
is 13.6 percent 1owr than in the no—tax case.
We can perform a loose decomposition of the total inefficiency
by considering two experiments ofthe type discussed earlier'.. First,
for th given housing stock, we reallocatethe
housing until the two household's marginal rates of substitutionbetween
housing services and the non—housing good are equal. Then we readjust24
transfers so as to keep one household just as well off. This elimination
of the exchange inefficiency reduces the excess burden from L67 to 1.54
percent of NNP. Just as in the riskiess model, the distorted allocation
of the housing stock is a non—trivial component of the tax systems inefficiency.
The next experiment keeps all capital and final good allocations the
same and reallocates the private bearing of risk until both households
have the same marginal rate of substitution between a risky claim and a
certain unit of income. This experiment by itself reduces the inefficiency
from 1.67 to 1.48 percent of NNP, thus accounting for about one—eighth of the
distortion. The riskiness of corporate capital income and the degree of
risk aversion parameters of the model are such that the utility loss
from bearing risk amounts, in the classical corporate income tax case, to
about 4.2 percent of the utility gained from the expected value of NNP.
However, the private risk is borne very inefficiently, with the higher taxed
individual in debt to buy corporate capital and the lower taxed individual
holding very little corporate equity. When the risk is efficiently reallocated,
the same amount of total risk causes disutility equal to 4.0 percent of NNP.
When both the exchange inefficiency and the risk bearing inefficiency
are eliminated, the excess burden declines from 1.67 to 1.35 percent of
net national product. Thus about one—fifth of the total burden may be thought
of as coning from these two usually ignored sources.
The welfare cost due to inefficient risk bearing was noted by Gordon
andMalkiel(1931).Theycalculated that the efficiency cost from
inefficient risk—bearing was approximately 0.01r2V,whereris the
nominalrisk—freerate of return and V is the total amount of risky
securities outstanding. In 1975, this amounted to $44 million, or only
0.004 percent of c.25
There are several reasons for the divergence between theGordon—Malkiel (G—M)
estimate and the one presented here, which is approximately 0.3 percentof
1'NP. First, their calculation, if performed correctly, yields awelfare
loss of 0.0lrV ,not0.01 r2V as theyidicate) Using their estimate
of 0.38 for r ,theircorrected measure of welfare loss is $550 million,
z
or 0.05 percent of GNP. Second, the G—M calculation assumesthat the only
source of risk is corporate equity. In themodel presented here, all
non—housing capital income is risky. If the fractionof total capital
that is risky is 0.5 (as it approximately is in the examplesused in this
paper) instead of approximately one—fourth, as assumed by G—M,and all risky
capital is equally risky, then their estimates of the efficiencycosts of
misallocating risk should be increased by a factor of two. Finally,the
illustrative values chosen by G—M imply that the before personal tax risk
premium of equity is only 0.048. However, calculations performed by,for
example, Friend and Blume (1975) indicate that the observedhistoric rate—of--return
premium earned by corporate shares has been on the order of 0.09.
A recalculation of the. efficiency loss due to inefficient risk—bearing
using numbers consistent with this risk premium would yield a substantially
larger magnitude.
If allthealtarationssuggested in the last paragraph are made,
the corrected G—M calculation of $550 million in efficiency loss would
become a figure on the order of three billion dollars (about 0.27




This paper suggests that, in their attempts to measure the distortion—
ary effect of the capital income tax system,economists may have been26
looking in the wrong places. In the presenceof uncertainty, the
intersectoral distortion may be much less thanhad previously been imagined.
However, it is important to recognizethat the tax system also distorts
the inter—household allocation of the housingstock and the inter—household
allocation ofrisk—bearing.Calculations using a computable two—person,
two—sector general equilibrium model suggest
that the excess burden from
these latter two distortions amount to nsignificant fraction of the
inter—sectoral inefficiency that has beenestimated in previous studies.
Several words of caution are in order here,First of all, the
figures presented here are based on oneparticular parameteriZatiofl of a
stylized economy. There are several reasonsto expect that a more realistic
model may alter the results somewhat.The assumed unit elasticity of demand
between housing services and the non—housinggood is on the high side of
recent econometric results. A lowerelasticity would reduce the estimate
of exchange inefficiency. The assumed dispersionin capital income tax
rates may somewhat overstate the true dispersion.Also, the presence
of tax—exempt securities puts a lower bound onthe after—tax rate of
interest earned by high tax bracket individuals, thuslimiting the
the opportunity cost of housing services.
On the other hand, though, the taxation of
nominal interest rates in the
presence of inflationservesto increase the dispersion. Also,the
existenceofrentalhousingas a source of housing servicesand as an
alternativeassetmustbedealt with in a complete treatmentof these
issues. Finally, the assumptionthat there is a riskiess asset inreal
terns is untenable in a worldof uncertain rates of inflation. Future
development of this approach shouldconsider the case where all assets,
including owner—occupied housing, earn astochastic return.27
These caveats all apply to the particular estimates of the impact of
the tax system on the. economy presented here. Improvements in the success
of the model in representing the U.S. economy will no doubt increase our
confidence in the model's predictions.1' Nevertheless, it seems clear
that models which maintain the three assumptions mentioned at the beginning
of this paper will likely fail to accurately assess the effects of alternative
systems of taxing capital income.28
Footnotes
See, for example, the excellent survey by NcLure (1975).





for any two individuals land j,wheret.is
Bi Bj
the ith individual's total tax rate on capital Income fron assetA.
FForfurther discussion of this point, see Feldsteinand S.enrod
(1980).
The other components are the rate of physical depreciation and the
(negative of the) expected capital gain. Since physical depreciation
on durable goods is not deductible from taxable income,this component
of opportunity cost is the same for all households. To the extent that
capital gains are taxable, the expected capital gain termwill vary by
household. The accrual—equivalent tax rate on capital gains on owner—
occuied housing is, however, very small and this source ofinter—household
variation in the opportunity cost of housing will be ignored in the
analysis that follows.
See Harberger (1966), p. 110.
In fact, sixty—five percent of all households are owner—occupiers.
This procedure is similar to the one adopted in u11erton etal
(1981).Note that owner—occupied housing is valued at its net—of—tax
full opportunity cost.29
-'Notice that when owner—occupied housing is one of the assets
t-e fact that the relative rate of tax on the two assetsdiffers does
not invite arbitraging or specialization. This is because the return
to owner—occupied housing is in the form of serviceswhich must be
consumed by the owner and are subject to diminishing marginal utility.
Shoven reports that, in the case where the two sectors have
elasticities of substitution of one and zero, the reduction in the capital
stock in response to a tax on gross capital income of 0.46 will amount to
13.7 percent (See Shoven (1976), p. 1270, Case 5). This result is only
broadly comparable to the example in the text due to differing parameterizations.
This utility function is a generalization to two goods of the
standard mean—variance utility function used in portfolio choice analysis.
For example, the foregoing analysis assumed that the tax system
reduces the expected return and standard deviation of the return by equal
factors. The validity of this assertion depends on corporate financial
behavior and the specific structure of corporation income taxation. See
the discussion below.
In the calculation of national income, risk is valued at the bearer's
marina1 rate o substitution. Alltheexcess burden terms mentioned in
this section are computed as percentages of the value of national income
including the(negative)value of the private risk.
The factors multiplying the integrals in the expression on page 188
of C—M should be divided by r ,asshould the values on the vertical
a:is of Figure 3 on the preceeding page.30
Another difference between the G—N calculation and the one reported
here is the presence of tax—exempt securities in the former model, In their
presence, it is niddie—income households who own equity, while those poorer
and richer own taxable debt and tax—exempt debt, respectively This implies
that the marginal rate of substitution between risk and certain income
is not monotonic with respect to tax rate, and the efficiency costs of
risk—bearing are less than in the absence of tax-exempt debt. See G—M,
pages 173—174.
See Slemrod (1982) for a more detailed general equilibrium model in
the same spirit as the one presented In Section III of this paper,31
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Appendix A
The following equations comprise the two—good, two—person model
discussed in section II of the paper.
1 =wL.+ r(lt.)K,+T. I =1,2 1 1 1 11









T.=s.R 1=1,2 1 1
wherethe terms not defined in the text are:
Y ; incomeincludingimputed service flow from house
ashare of spending for housing services
E ; corporate equity holdings
K ; corporate capital
y ; share of corporate value added for capital income
s ; share of tax revenue transferred back to individual
The parameter values used in the text examples are:
L.=50 a.=O.15 K175 1=0.2 s.O.5 60.0434
Table 1
Solution Details o General Equilibrium Model With No Uncertainty
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
=0
t2
=0 t1 =0.3t20,3 t1 =0.1t2
=0,5
















r 110.4 0.115 0.116
w 0.937 0.919 0.917
R 0 6.89 6.45







The following equations comprise the two—good, two—person model
withuncertainty discussedin Section III of the paper.
1l,2
C. =(l—a.)Y. 1 2





























Theparameter values used in the text example are:
L.=50a=O.l5K.=175 y =0.2 s.=O.53 a0.04 =0.04
1 1 1 1 E36
Table 2
Solution Details of General Equilibrium Model With Uncertainty
Case .1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
tBl =0tEl =0tBI =0.3tEl =0.3tBl =0.1tEl =0.1
tBi= 0.1
tEl0.43
tB20 tB2 =0tB2 =0.3tE2 =0.3tB2 =0.5tB2 =0.5E2 =0.5tE2 =0.55
K 177.5 165.2 164.0 153.3
C
172.5 184.8 l86.0 196.7
88.7 82.6 55.7 23.1
H1 86.3 92.4 82.7 85.2
B1
0 0 36.6 66.8
C1
49.2 47.9 50.2 47.4
E2 88.7 82.6 108.3 130.2
112 86.3 92.4 103.3 111.5
B2
0 0 —36.6 —66.8
C2 49.2 47.9 45.3 45,7
rB
0.061. 0.073 0.075 0.065
rE
0.126 0.126 0.135 0.142
w 0.897 0.884 0.883 0.871
R 0 6.63 6.94 9.86
7. change in
real income —0,4/i —0.65 —1,67
7. change with
efficient housing allocation —0,51 —1.54
%change with
efficient risk bearing -1.48
% change with
efficient housing allocation —l 35
and efficient risk bearing